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Abstract 
 
This article analyses the importance of labour market institutions and, in particular, collective wage 
bargaining in shaping regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. Using microdata from the 
Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey, our results reveal that there are significant inter-regional wage 
differences for similarly skilled workers. These differences are present throughout the whole wage 
structure and can be explained by both competitive and non-competitive factors, such as an insufficient 
competition in product markets. In this context, industry-level collective bargaining plays a major role in 
accounting for regional wage differences, a role that in the Spanish case is enhanced due to its unusual 
regional dimension.  
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1. Introduction 
Regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers occur in developed countries 
with markedly different institutional settings (Teulings and Hartog, 1998).1 The 
magnitude and nature of these wage differentials have, potentially, major implications 
on the working of the labour market. If regional wage differentials are competitive and 
wide enough, wages can act as signals for efficient labour allocation between 
regions. If, on the other hand, certain factors prevent the emergence of regional 
differences (or generate non-competitive differences), the equalisation of the 
marginal productivity of similarly skilled workers across the regions is impeded and 
wages do not adapt properly to differences in local labour market conditions causing 
a distorting effect in the allocation of labour.  
 
An important issue in this context is the extent to which wage differentials across the 
regions are conditioned by wage-setting labour market institutions. Statutory 
minimum wages and, in particular, collective bargaining are major factors in wage 
determination and, in practice, they have a strong influence on the wage structure of 
developed countries (Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Nickell and Layard, 1999). 
Consequently, these factors also have an influence on the magnitude and nature of 
inter-regional wage differentials. In this sense, the European Union stresses the need 
to change the systems of collective bargaining and wage determination that, 
inasmuch as they do not vary from one territory to another in most EU member 
states, might result in regional wage structures that are  inflexible and fail to adjust to 
3local labour market conditions (Eurostat, 2003). In this context, the OECD (2004) 
also highlights the need to analyse “whether certain organisational forms of collective 
bargaining undermine employment performance by tending to result in (…) a 
compressed wage structure which does not adequately reflect differences in 
productivity between workers and regions”. 
 
The aim of this article is to analyse inter-regional wage differentials in the Spanish 
labour market and to establish their relationship with industry-level collective 
bargaining. We consider the Spanish case to be of great interest within this context 
for several reasons. First, Spain is one of the few EU countries in which collective 
agreements at branch level apply just to provinces or regions and in which industrial 
collective bargaining operates at an infra-national scale (EIRO, 2000). Furthermore, 
available evidence strongly suggests that the type of industrial collective bargaining 
influences the magnitude of inter-regional wage differentials (Simón and Russell, 
2004), since these differences are much more marked in Spain than in other 
European countries (namely, Belgium and Italy) where industrial collective bargaining 
agreements are conducted nationally, or even in those with decentralized systems of 
collective bargaining where industrial collective bargaining does not occur (Britain). 
Second, microdata describing industry minimum wages fixed by collective 
agreements at branch level - i.e. the binding wage scales in the Spanish labour 
market - are exceptionally available for the Spanish economy. We can therefore 
examine the real influence of collective bargaining on regional wage differentials. The 
insights offered by this data constitute a significant novelty as regards existing 
studies in the literature on wage determination. 
 
Previous studies analysing regional wage differences based on modern theories of 
4wage determination are somewhat scarce. Blackaby and Manning (1987) and 
Blackaby and Murphy (1991) undertook the first studies of this kind, but there has 
been little continuity, with the sole exception of Mullen and Williams (2001). This 
article seeks to advance this line of research by exploring the role that collective 
bargaining plays in shaping inter-regional wage differentials. Although our analysis is 
limited to this wage-setting institution, we believe that this choice is largely supported 
by the empirical findings in the literature. 
 
The main contribution of our article to the current literature comprises the use of 
microdata in directly examining the influence of minimum wages established by 
industry-level collective bargaining on the determination of regional wages. To the 
best of our knowledge, empirical evidence on this issue does not exist. This can 
largely be explained by the scarcity of information on industry minimum wages in 
European countries where industry-level collective bargaining prevails.2
This article is structured as follows. After this introduction, the second section 
estimates the regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. The third 
section examines the degree of similarity in industry minimum wages and actual 
wages across the Spanish regions. The fourth section identifies those factors that 
account for inter-regional wage differentials and the extent to which they correspond 
to competitive explanations of wage determination. The article ends with a summary 
of the results reported and discusses the main conclusions to be drawn from the 
analysis.  
 
2. Inter-regional wage differentials in Spain 
In this section, we estimate Spanish inter-regional wage differentials using cross-section 
5microdata drawn from the Structure of Earnings Survey 1995 (Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial; hereinafter SES) carried out by the Spanish National Statistics Office (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística). The SES is a national sample of salaried workers from 
randomly selected firms. As the SES comprises a sample of workers at each firm, it 
consists of matched employer-employee data with a wealth of information on factors 
concerning the characteristics of the individual, job and workplace. The SES covers 
Spanish firms employing at least ten workers in economic activities different to 
agriculture and fisheries and in various service activity branches. After an initial filter of 
individuals with missing information, those with extremely high and low hourly wages, 
workers in Ceuta and Melilla, and those with an apprenticeship contract were also 
filtered out. The final sample comprised 156,009 workers. The wage concept is the 
natural logarithm of the gross hourly wage. This is calculated as the ratio of gross pay 
and the number of hours worked per year. Gross pay does not include overtime or 
bonuses for shift work, night work and/or weekend work. 
 
Our approach to the analysis of inter-regional wage differentials follows the standard 
procedure in the inter-industry wage literature pioneered by Krueger and Summers 
(1988) and improved by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997)3. In other words, we 
estimate a cross-section Mincerian wage equation by restricted least squares of the 
form: 
 wij =  + Xi + Zj + Ej + ij (1) 
Where wij denotes the natural logarithm of the gross hourly wage of worker i in region j;
Xi stands for a vector of individual and job controls which are described below; Zj
includes a set of mutually exclusive dummies which cover all regions (there are 17 
regions in Spain); Ej indicates a vector of establishment controls;  is the intercept; , 
6and  are vectors of the parameters to be estimated; and ij is a random disturbance 
term.  
 
The individual controls include a gender indicator and a set of standard human capital 
variables that comprise an individual’s general education (measured as the highest 
educational qualification achieved), potential experience and its squared value and the 
time spent with the current employer and its squared value. Potential experience is 
measured as current age minus age on first entering the labour market after leaving full-
time schooling. Unfortunately, experience has to be approximated because, as is usual 
in most datasets, we are unable to measure actual experience and this cannot be 
inferred from the information available in our data. Job controls are dummies for 
occupational group, a dummy for an indefinite duration contract and a dummy for full-
time job. Workplace controls are industry dummies (the data report industry affiliation at 
the two-digit NACE nomenclature), firm size dummies and bargaining regime indicators 
(three types of collective agreements are considered: industry-level collective 
agreements at a regional level, industry-level collective agreements at the national level 
and firm-specific agreements). 
 
 is the vector of parameters of interest to us in this study. Since the cross-product 
matrix of regressors of the equation (1) is not one of full rank, the subsequent linear 
constraint is imposed: 
j
njj=0, where nj is the employment share in region j. As in this 
constrained model every region is assigned a dummy variable (which would produce a 
singularity in an unconstrained model with a constant term), the restriction on the 
weighted sum of the region coefficients allows the model to be estimated. Furthermore, 
it enables us to obtain unbiased standard errors of the coefficients (Haisken-DeNew 
7and Schmidt, 1997). The reported region coefficients may be interpreted as 
(approximately)4 the proportionate difference in wages between a worker in a region 
and the average worker with similar productive and job and workplace characteristics 
across all regions. 
 
The standard deviation of the regional wage differentials measures their overall 
variability: 
 SD()=  
j j
jjjj nn 22  (2) 
Where 2j are the variances of the estimated region coefficients, j, and SD() gives 
the employment-weighted adjusted standard deviation of the j‘s. The second term in 
the equation corrects for the fact that inter-regional wage differences are estimated with 
an ordinary least squares sampling error that could overestimate the standard deviation 
of the differentials.  
 
The first column in Table 1 reports inter-regional wage differentials estimated with the 
full set of controls.5 A group significance F-test shows that the null hypothesis that 
regional wage differentials jointly equal zero can be rejected at better than the 1% level. 
Moreover, most of the regional dummy coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels (the exceptions are the non-significant coefficients of 
Aragon and the Balearic Islands), so that wages in almost every Spanish region 
typically differ from the national average wage. Regional wage premia range from under 
15% in Extremadura to over 9% in the Basque Country6 and their employment-
weighted adjusted standard deviation is of 0.075 log points7. Simón and Russell (2004) 
estimated the magnitude of wage differentials between regions in several developed 
countries (Italy, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Spain) with harmonised microdata 
8from the European Structure of Earnings Survey 1995, and adopting the same 
methodology applied in this study.8 The employment-weighted adjusted standard 
deviation of the region differentials was of 0.028 log points in Belgium (with three 
regions being considered); 0.030 in Italy (ten regions); 0.052 in Britain (eleven regions) 
and 0.067 in Spain (seven regions). This comparative evidence shows that regional 
wage differentiation is widespread in the Spanish labour market. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The first column in Table 2 reports quantile regression estimates of region premia wage 
differentials at different points in the wage distribution (namely, the 10th, 25th, 50th, 
75th and 90th percentiles).9 Results indicate that highly significant inter-regional wage 
differentials exist throughout the wage structure spectrum and that their dispersion is 
quite similar across different parts of the wage distribution. The same results hold when 
different occupations are considered. Yet, interestingly, noticeable differences emerge 
as regards the type of collective agreement. Wage differentials between territories are 
much more marked for workers covered by branch-level collective agreements at the 
regional level (the adjusted standard deviation of regional wage differentials is in this 
case of 0.096) than for those covered by a national branch agreement (0.053) or a firm-
specific agreement (0.067). The influence of industry-level collective bargaining at the 
infra-national level on the shaping of regional wage differentials in the Spanish labour 
market is, thus, quite compelling. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
An additional issue to note is that the pattern of inter-regional wage differentials is 
9largely similar across occupations and in different parts of the distribution, as shown by 
the high and significant bivariate correlations of those differentials (Tables 3 and 4). 
This finding confirms that low- and high-wage regions in Spain generally present this 
feature for all types of worker. 
 
(INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In order to analyse further the significance of the region in determining wage levels, a 
wage variance breakdown was carried out. This is based on the estimation of different 
specifications of the wage equation (1), and it enables us to separate total wage 
variance into different components, after separately regressing individual wages on a 
set of regional dummies, on individual and workplace controls and on both sets of 
attributes. Based on the coefficients of determination of the above wage regressions, 
this technique allows us to distinguish absolute and marginal fractions of wage variance 
explained by regions (see the note to Table 5). Regions actually explain a non-
negligible proportion of the variance of individual wages, between 1.8 and 6.8%.10 Yet, 
the relative influence of the region on wage determination varies sharply with the type of 
collective agreement. In fact, it is much more important for workers covered by industry-
level collective agreements operating regionally (in this case the region accounts for 
between 3.9 and 10% of individual wage variability) than for those covered by a national 
branch (0.9 to 4%) or a firm-specific agreement (1.6 to 4.4%). This evidence confirms 
that regional wage variability is strongly related to the structure of industry-level 
collective bargaining.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
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3. Industry-level collective bargaining and regional wage differentials 
This section of the article analyzes the influence of industry-level collective bargaining 
on regional wage determination in the Spanish labour market. In order to put the 
analysis into context, it begins with a brief description of the Spanish collective 
bargaining system. Then, after estimating regional differences in minimum wages, this 
pattern is compared with that of actual wages. 
 
As noted above, collective bargaining and statutory minimum wages are prominent 
wage-setting institutions. In practice countries with centralised collective bargaining 
systems and/or with a national minimum wage tend to have more compressed wage 
structures (Blau and Kahn, 1999 and Nickell and Layard, 1999). The Spanish statutory 
minimum wage (Salario Mínimo Interprofesional) is among the lowest (relative to the 
median or average wages) of all developed countries (OECD, 1998). As it is also 
systematically lower than wage floors set by industry-level collective agreements, it is 
not actually a binding wage floor. Furthermore, it does not vary between regions. For 
this reason, this institution is expected to have only a minor influence on the shaping of 
regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. As regards the Spanish system 
of collective bargaining, its main features correspond roughly with those of the 
centralised systems of other European Union countries (EIRO, 2002). Thus, the most 
important level of bargaining is branch-level bargaining (although firm-level bargaining 
also exists); coordination between the different units of negotiation is noticeable 
(although it is slightly less intense than in other European Union countries: Nickell and 
Layard, 1999) and the coverage rate is high (85-90%), largely because collective 
agreements extend by law to all suitable workers and firms. An unusual feature of the 
Spanish system, however, is that industry agreements usually operate at an infra-
national level, and typically take effect at the province level, while, with just a few 
11
exceptions, in other European countries in which industry-level bargaining is prevalent, 
industry agreements cover the entire economy (EIRO, 2000). 
 
Industry agreements set wage floors for every occupation (categoría profesional) which, 
as noted above, constitute the binding minimum wages in the Spanish labour market. 
These minimum wages differ greatly from one agreement to another within 
occupations, with particularly large inter-regional differentials (Lorences et al., 1995 and 
Simón, 2001a). According to available empirical evidence, they also have a strong 
influence on the actual wage structure of the Spanish labour market (Dolado and 
Felgueroso, 1997 and Simón, 2001b).  
 
A collective bargaining system in which the effects on wage determination are high and 
where most of the industry-level collective agreements operate at an infra-national level 
lends credibility to the argument that inter-regional wage differences in the Spanish 
labour market might well be influenced by industry minimum wages. This possibility can 
only be examined thanks to the availability of a database with microdata on industry 
minimum wages for the Spanish labour market that covers the same industries and the 
same year, 1995, as the EES.11 The analysis is constrained to collective agreements 
operating at an infra-national level. 
 
Inter-regional differences in industry minimum wages are estimated using a wage 
equation in which the dependent variable is the agreed wage and the explanatory 
variables are region dummies and occupation and industry controls: 12 
tij =  + Ci + Zj + Sj + ij                                         (3) 
Where tij denotes the natural logarithm of the minimum wage of occupation i in 
collective agreement j; Ci stands for a vector of occupation controls;13 Zj includes a set 
12
of mutually exclusive regional dummies which cover all regions; Sj indicates a vector of 
industry controls;  is the intercept; ,  and  are vectors of the parameters to be 
estimated; and ij is a random disturbance term.  
 
The empirical results confirm that industry agreements at an infra-national level set 
minimum wages that differ from one region to another for the same industry and 
occupation (Table 1). A group significance F-test shows that the null hypothesis that 
regional wage differentials in agreed wages jointly equal zero can be rejected at better 
than the 1% level. Industry minimum wages in almost every Spanish region differ 
significantly from the national average, with the only exceptions of Murcia and 
Cantabria. Regionally agreed wage premia range from a low of under 14% in 
Extremadura to a high of over 18% in the Basque Country and the employment-
weighted adjusted standard deviation of the region differentials is of 0.080 log points. 
 
Inter-regional differences in actual and agreed wages are roughly similar in dispersion 
(the adjusted standard deviation is of 0.080 and 0.075 log points) or in pattern (the 
bivariate correlation coefficient is of 0.8 and statistically significant), which reveals the 
strong influence of industry-level collective bargaining in shaping regional wage 
differentials. This influence is particularly marked independent of the type of worker and 
throughout the whole wage distribution (Table 2). Furthermore, this evidence is 
consistent with the fact that differences between industry-level collective agreements in 
industry minimum wages are largely similar for all kinds of worker (Simón, 2001c). The 
similarity recorded in the inter-regional differences in actual and agreed wages is 
especially significant for workers covered by industry agreements operating at an infra-
national level. Yet, the fact that the relationship is also significant for those workers 
covered by a firm-specific or a national branch agreement requires an explanation. 
13
Firm-specific agreements improve industry minimum wages through a typical wage drift 
mechanism, so inter-regional differences in industry minimum wages very plausibly 
spread to wages set in this level of collective bargaining. On the other hand, to the 
extent that industry wages in a region are particularly influenced by the wages set in the 
other industries in the same region (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998 and Bajo et al., 1999), 
spillover effects in regional wage determination from those industries covered by 
regional collective bargaining to those covered by national collective agreements may 
well account for this latter effect.  
 
Annual changes in industry minimum wages are very similar in all the regions of Spain 
(Alonso and Izquierdo, 1999). As a result, inter-regional differences in industry minimum 
wages can be expected to be roughly the same from one year to the next, which is 
consistent with the time persistence of inter-regional differences in actual wages 
(Villaverde and Maza, 2002) and, finally, with a non-transitory influence of collective 
bargaining in shaping regional wage differences. 
 
In short, the overall empirical evidence clearly suggests that inter-regional wage 
differences in the Spanish labour market are driven by industry-level collective 
bargaining. It is, therefore, important for us to determine whether these wage 
differentials correspond to a competitive wage determination mechanism. This matter is 
examined in section 4 below. 
 
4. The nature of the regional wage structure 
Regional wage differences can be related to the existence of a competitive labour 
market, in which wages act as signals for the efficient reallocation of labour by 
14
migration. Alternatively, wage differences can also be related to non-competitive factors 
that impede the equalisation of the labour marginal productivities of similar workers 
living in different regions. In this second case, wages would distort the efficient 
allocation of labour and this could have adverse effects via unemployment and income 
inequality (OECD, 2000). 
 
Competitive explanations of permanent inter-regional wage differences are based on 
labour supply characteristics – human capital, regional price characteristics, 
compensatory differences (Rosen, 1986), or differences in the amenities of the different 
regions that equalise the utility of workers between them (Blackaby and Murphy, 1991 
and OECD, 2000). The other regional wage differences that do not affect workers’ utility 
should disappear through labour and capital mobility (Blackaby and Manning, 1987).  
 
The inter-regional wage differences for Spain estimated in the previous section are for 
workers with similar human capital levels and their geographical structure does not 
seem to be transitory. For this reason, wage differences would only be competitive in 
nature if they were related to differences in price levels or other non-monetary factors. 
In order to test this possibility, we re-estimated the wage equation (1) substituting the 
regional dummies with the price level for each region and with other regional variables 
related to non-monetary factors. Thus, equation (1) is replaced with the following model: 
 wij =  + Xi + Rj + Ej + ij (4) 
Where Rj represents the different variables related to the aforementioned 
characteristics of region j.
However, the theoretical results reported by Moulton (1986) show that in models 
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such as (4) the use of OLS would cause an upward bias in the values of the t-statistic 
for the explanatory variables defined at a higher level of aggregation than that of the 
endogenous variable. For this reason, equation (4) is estimated using Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) following Rauch (1993). The estimation process 
is specifically focused so as to obtain a consistent estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix of the error term (taking into account its regional structure) as well 
as to use this matrix to transform the original data properly and obtain efficient 
estimates for the coefficients considered. 
 
The logarithm of the regional price level presented the expected positive sign for each 
of the specifications, in line with the competitive approach (Table 6). Regional price 
differences thus influence wage differences, so that workers seek to obtain 
compensation to cover the  differences in regional costs of living. This result holds when 
regional housing prices are included in the specification.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Inter-regional wage differences also compensate for the unequal attraction of Spanish 
regions as certain regional characteristics related to the attractiveness of the territories 
are statistically significant and present the signs predicted by compensatory differences 
theory (columns II to V of Table 6). In particular, the advantages associated with a 
coastal location or with a better climate compensate for lower wage incomes. Similarly, 
leisure attractions and health facilities have the same compensatory effect. Thus, a part 
of the Spanish regional wage differences is caused by competitive factors. 
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Regional productivity differences related to unequal efficiency levels or to the limited 
mobility of some factors might generate wage differences that cannot be attributed to 
competitive mechanisms. As the main determinant of productivity is the accumulation of 
capital (physical, human and technological), we included some of these factors in the 
specification. As individual human capital is already controlled in equation (4), we only 
considered the influence of the regional private physical stock and the regional 
technological level (R+D expenses). The separate inclusion of these two factors 
provided similar results: both have a positive and significant effect on productivity and 
regional wages.14 
The possibility that firms might obtain monopoly rents due to the insufficient competition 
of market products should make it possible for them to pay higher wages (Groshen, 
1991). Therefore, if the competitive pressure varies between the regions, the rents 
generated and the wages paid might also differ. The results obtained when including an 
indicator of competition in regional product markets in the analysis clearly confirm this 
effect, as even a simple indicator (the ratio between imports and GDP) is significant with 
the expected negative sign.  
 
But imperfections are not limited to market products. In fact, the labour market is 
characterized by a set of regulations and institutional factors that condition the 
functioning of market forces. During the last few decades, theoretical research on wage 
determination mechanisms have highlighted the role of the workers' bargaining power, 
in particular, that of insiders, given the impact of unemployment on the strategy and 
behaviour of the agents.15 According to these models, strong union bargaining power 
and a low unemployment rate will lead to higher wages. The inclusion in the regression 
of proxy variables to reflect both effects confirms this impact: union power (measured as 
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the success of strikes) has a positive and significant effect on regional wages, while the 
unemployment rate has a negative effect, regardless of the inclusion of other regional 
characteristics (columns IV and V of Table 6). 
 
A negative effect of the unemployment rate on wages is the opposite to what one would 
expect in a competitive framework of wage bargaining, as wages should be higher to 
compensate workers in regions with higher unemployment rates (Harris and Todaro, 
1970). However, a negative relationship best fits the predictions of the aforementioned 
non-competitive theories. The value of the elasticity of wages to the regional 
unemployment rates is -0.03, which is clearly below that of -0.10 that seems to be an 
empirical regularity in developed countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994), and also 
below the estimates for Spain provided by García and Montuenga (2003) and by 
Sanromá and Ramos (2003). This low value could be the effect of certain level of 
territorial aggregation (here NUTS II).  
 
Summarising, the results obtained, and in particular those related to the effect of limited 
competition on market products and institutional factors on the labour markets, provide 
direct evidence of the non-competitive nature of regional wage differences. These 
results suggest that regional wage differences in Spain do not encourage, at least in 
part, an efficient allocation of labour resources. It should also be considered that labour 
mobility is very low in Spain, as inter-regional migrations have responded only very 
weakly in the past to wage differentials and employment opportunities as measured by 
regional unemployment rates (Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998), so that a distinctive feature 
of the Spanish labour market are regional unemployment disparities that tend to persist 
(Sáez and Murillo, 1996).   
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In order to confirm the influence of collective bargaining on regional wage differences, 
we conducted a final empirical analysis. This analysis consisted of analysing whether 
the variables accounting for regional wage differences also explain regional differences 
in industry minimum wages. If these variables explain regional industry minimum 
wages, the importance of collective bargaining in determining explaining regional wage 
differences would be confirmed. In order to do this, we replaced equation (3) with the 
following model: 
 tij =  + Ci +Rj + Sj + ’’ij (5) 
Where Rj represents the different variables related to the aforementioned 
characteristics of region j.
The results of estimating this equation were as expected (Table 7). With the sole 
exceptions of housing prices and leisure attractions, which were no longer statistically 
significant, the explanatory factors of actual wages also accounted for industry 
minimum wages fixed by rounds of collective bargaining. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The results also highlight a number of additional points. First, one difference between 
Tables 6 and 7 is that the physical capital stock has been replaced by R+D expenses. 
In fact, the physical capital stock does not explain adequately the industry minimum 
wage, while R+D expenses are clearly statistically significant. As both variables might 
reflect the effects of productivity differences on wages, this substitution does not seem 
to be particularly relevant16. A second aspect that is worth mentioning is the fact that the 
compensatory variables have the expected signs (with the previously mentioned 
exceptions) and are statistically significant at the usual levels. From this it can be 
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deduced that in the bargaining process, social agents bear the characteristics of the 
territory very much in mind, so it cannot be claimed that unions distort the bargaining 
process without mentioning that they also give some prominence to certain supply or 
competitive factors. 
 
A third issue to be emphasised is that the values of the coefficients are, in general, 
higher for the models in which the endogenous variable is the industry minimum wage 
(Table 7) than in those in which the analysed variable are actual wages (Table 6). 
Furthermore, these  differences are statistically significant. The elasticity to prices is 
higher for industry minimum wages, which can be interpreted as evidence of an 
indexation of agreements higher than for actual wages. The elasticity of industry 
minimum wages to external competition is also higher, which implies that the framework 
for the distribution of firms' rents is collective bargaining. Finally, the variables related to 
labour market conditions are also more significant for industry minimum wage than they 
are for actual wages. Thus, non-competitive wage determination theories show a 
greater explanatory capacity for bargained wages than for actual wages. This result 
seems reasonable as actual wages are also influenced by individual characteristics that 
have only been partially controlled by individual explanatory variables in the wage 
equation, and which are translated into a wage drift that is totally alien to labour market 
institutions. 
 
It can be concluded that the same factors - both competitive and non-competitive - that 
account for the industry minimum wage also account for actual wages. For this reason, 
the non-competitive nature of inter-regional wage differences is already present in 
regional collective agreements. In this sense, the role of collective bargaining in 
determining inter-regional wage differences is clearly strengthened. 
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5. Conclusions 
The Spanish economy is characterised by the presence of marked wage differences 
between workers with the same level of skills. These differences are related to regional 
allocation patterns. In practice, inter-regional wage differences are an important factor in 
determining individual wages and are present at all levels of the wage structure, with 
the implication that relative regional wages are very similar for all workers.  
 
The existence of inter-regional wage differences for similarly skilled workers challenges 
the possibility that these differences might be explained by different human capital 
levels across the regions. Inter-regional wage differences cannot be fully explained by 
other competitive factors and, as a result, these differences do not contribute to a more 
efficient functioning of the wage setting mechanism and a more efficient Spanish labour 
market. In this line of reasoning, our results show that limited and unequal competition 
levels in product markets and certain restrictions operating on factor accumulation 
induce regional wage differences that hinder an efficient factor allocation at the regional 
level. 
 
The main contribution of this article is the empirical demonstration that inter-regional 
wage differences are related to the characteristics of the collective bargaining system. 
The evidence reported here reveals that collective bargaining is responsible for the 
existence of such wage differences. Inter-regional differences in actual and bargained 
wages are extremely similar, which indicates that the regional structure of bargained 
wages at the sectoral level is largely the origin of regional wage differences in the 
Spanish labour market. Moreover, the influence of the territory in determining wage 
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levels is more important for workers covered by regional sectoral agreements than for 
workers covered by national agreements. This shows that the influence of collective 
bargaining in generating regional wage differences is enhanced by the regional 
dimension of the system in the Spanish case, where sectoral agreements for territories 
at a level below that of the national level predominate. From a comparative perspective, 
inter-regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market are very high. In this 
sense, our evidence suggests that the presence of sectoral agreements at the national 
level - a common feature in more than one European Union country - limits wage 
flexibility and leads to a lower regional wage differentiation. 
 
Finally, the same competitive and non-competitive factors that account for the 
bargained industry minimum wage also determine actual wages, which strengthens the 
significance of  the collective bargaining system in the generation of inter-regional wage 
differences. 
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Table 1 
Inter-regional wage differences in the Spanish labour market. 1995. 
Actual wages (Structure 
of Earnings Survey) 
Industry minimum wages 
(NUTS II and NUTS III 
industry-level collective 
agreements) Region 
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Andalusia -0.008 ** 0.003 -0.011 * 0.004 
Aragon -0.004 0.004 -0.049 ** 0.008 
Asturias -0.030 ** 0.004 0.024 * 0.011 
Balearic Islands -0.003 0.005 0.080 ** 0.022 
Canary Islands -0.084 ** 0.004 -0.034 ** 0.009 
Cantabria -0.024 ** 0.004 -0.022 0.007 
Castilla-La Mancha -0.062 ** 0.004 -0.076 ** 0.005 
Castilla y León -0.041 ** 0.003 -0.059 ** 0.012 
Catalonia  0.078 ** 0.002 0.055 ** 0.005 
Comunidad Valenciana -0.022 ** 0.003 -0.025 ** 0.006 
Extremadura -0.148 ** 0.006 -0.143 ** 0.012 
Galicia -0.142 ** 0.003 -0.102 ** 0.006 
Madrid  0.079 ** 0.002 0.016 * 0.008 
Murcia -0.122 ** 0.004 -0.039 ** 0.011 
Navarra  0.080 ** 0.004 0.113 ** 0.012 
Basque Country  0.090 ** 0.003 0.177 ** 0.007 
Rioja -0.016 ** 0.006 0.056 ** 0.015 
Adjusted standard deviation 0.075 0.080 
Observations 156,009 5,632 
Note: Regional dummy coefficients measure differences relative to the national average wage and were 
estimated using restricted least squares in equations (1) and (2). ** and * indicate that the variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2 
Adjusted standard deviation of inter-regional wage differences and correspondence between 
the regional differences in actual and bargained wages 1995. 
Adjusted standard 
deviation 
Correspondence 
between regional 
differences in 
bargained and actual 
wages 
ALL WORKERS 0.075** 0.822** 
PERCENTILE 
Percentile 10 0.076** 0.834** 
Quartile 25 0.074** 0.871** 
Median 0.076** 0.848** 
Quartile 75 0.079** 0.779** 
Percentile 90 0.081** 0.677** 
OCCUPATION 
Labourers 0.083** 0.748** 
Manual qualified workers 0.080** 0.861** 
Administrative workers 0.060** 0.729** 
Technicians 0.075** 0.703** 
Medium and highly qualified workers 0.064** 0.599** 
Managers 0.100** 0.665** 
TYPE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
National 0.053** 0.727** 
Regional 0.096** 0.843** 
Firm-specific 0.067** 0.748** 
Note: The values in the left-hand column are the adjusted standard deviations of the coefficients of the regional 
dummy variables estimated from wage equation (1). As indicated in the table, these differentials were estimated for 
the whole sample but also for different groups of workers, and in different percentiles of the distribution of individual 
wages. ** indicates that wage differences are statistically different from zero with a significance level lower than 1%. 
The right-hand column shows the value of Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient of the regional dummy 
coefficients estimated in wage equations (1) and (2). ** and * indicate that the correlation is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in a bilateral test. 
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Table 3 
Correspondence of inter-regional wage differences by occupational groups. Structure of 
Earnings Survey 1995. 
Labourers
Manualqualified
workers
Administrative
workers
Technicians
Medium
and
highlyqualified
workers
Managers
Labourers 1 0.925** 0.910** 0.724** 0.865** 0.739** 
Manual qualified workers 1 0.883** 0.769** 0.752** 0.720** 
Administrative workers 1 0.846** 0.855** 0.749** 
Technicians 1 0.746** 0.846** 
Medium and highly qualified workers 1 0.796** 
Managers 1
Note: The values of Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient for each pair of coefficients of the regional dummy 
variables in the different estimations of wage equation (1) for each occupational group. ** and * indicate that the 
correlation is statistically significant at the 1% and 5%, respectively, in a bilateral test. 
 
Table 4 
Correspondence of inter-regional wage differences in the different percentiles of the wage 
structure. Structure of Earnings Survey 1995. 
Percentile
10
Quartile25
Median
Quartile75
Percentile
90
Percentile 10 1 0.976** 0.901** 0.787** 0.675*
Quartile 25  1 0.969** 0.892** 0.800** 
Median   1 0.974** 0.912** 
Quartile 75    1 0.975** 
Percentile 90     1 
Note: The values of Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficient for each point of the wage distribution of the coefficients 
of the regional dummy variables in the different estimations of wage equation (1) for each percentile. ** and * indicate 
that the correlation is statistically significant at the 1% and 5%, respectively, in a bilateral test. 
 
Table 5 
Regional and individual wage variability in the Spanish labour market. Structure of Earnings 
Survey 1995. 
Variability of individual wages explained 
by the region (%) 
Minimum bound 
( 22 BA RR  )x100 
Maximum bound 
( 2CR )x100 
ALL WORKERS 1.8  6.8 
TYPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 
National 0.9 4.0 
Regional 3.9 10.0 
Firm-specific 1.6 4.4 
Note: 2CR , 2BR and 2AR are the values of the goodness of fit coefficient in three different specifications of the wage 
equation including, respectively, the following explanatory variables: regional dummies, only the rest of explanatory 
variables in equation (1), and both sets of variables. 
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Table 6 
Regional wages and regional characteristics. 
I II III IV V 
Price level (log) 0.8154** 1.3313** 1.2655** 1.3817** 1.2889** 
Housing price level(log) 0.1174** 0.0789** 0.0671** 0.0743** 0.0610** 
Amenities  
Coast kilometres (log) - -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0123**
Climatic mildness indicator - -0.0001* -0.002** 0.0001 -0.0002**
Number of cinemas per capita (log) - -0.0707** -0.0562** -0.0753** -0.0614**
Hospital beds per capita (log) - -0.0614** -0.0403** -0.0756** -0.0571**
Physical capital stock (log) - - 0.0120** - 0.0156** 
External competition indicator - - -0.0081** - -0.0087**
Non-agriculture unemployment rate (log)  - - -0.0158** -0.0312**
Trade unions bargaining power indicator - - - 0.0099** 0.0107** 
Note: Estimated coefficients for the variables indicated in the left-hand column when they are included in wage 
equation (3) replacing the regional dummy variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These estimates were obtained using Feasible Generalized Least Squares as 
proposed by Rauch (1993). The regional price level for 1995 was calculated from the estimates of relative regional 
price levels by FIES (Alcaide and Alcaide, 1999). The regional housing price level was defined as the average price 
per square meter in 1995 for new housing according to the web page of the Ministerio de Fomento. Coast kilometres, 
the number of cinemas per capita and hospital beds per capita were obtained from the Anuario Estadístico de España 
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. The climatic mildness indicator was obtained by applying the methodology 
proposed in the Places Rated Almanac by Boyer and Savageau (1985) using information from the Anuario Estadístico 
de España. The private physical capital stock data for 1995 (excluding agriculture and fishery) in each region was 
obtained from Stock de Capital en España y su distribución territorial (1964-2000) of Fundación BBVA. The external 
competition indicator was defined as the ratio between the imports in each region and its Gross Domestic Product in 
1995 according to the Contabilidad Regional de España for 1995, prepared by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
Regional non-agriculture unemployment rates were calculated as the average of the quarterly data for 1995 in the 
Encuesta de Población Activa, prepared by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Finally, the trade unions bargaining 
power indicator measures the capability of trade unions to go on strike. In particular, it is defined as the ratio of 
workers on strike in each region in the case of general strikes during the period 1992-1995 (Boletín de Estadísticas 
Laborales). 
 
Table 7 
Regional industry minimum wage and regional characteristics 
I II III IV V 
Price level (log) 1.4304** 1.5646** 1.6425** 1.5575** 1.6382** 
Housing price level(log) 0.0454** 0.0544** 0.0489** 0.0098 0.0090 
Attraction factors      
Coast kilometres (log) - -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001**
Climatic mildness indicator - -0.0007* -0.0005** -0.0007** -0.0008**
Number of cinemas per capita (log) - -0.0332** -0.0140** 0.0294** 0.0268 
Hospital beds per capita (log) - -0.1330** -0.0863** -0.1074** -0.0761**
R+D expenses related to GDP - - 0.0280** - 0.0322** 
External competition indicator - - -0.0566** - -0.0363**
Non-agriculture unemployment rate (log)  - - -0.0972** -0.0698**
Trade unions bargaining power indicator - - - 0.0381** 0.0297** 
Note: Estimated coefficients for the variables indicated in the left-hand column where they are included in the wage 
equation (4) replacing the regional dummy variables. ** and * indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These estimates have been obtained using Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
as proposed by Rauch (1993). Regional data of R+D expenses related to GDP were obtained from Estadísticas sobre 
actividades de I+D and Contabilidad Regional de España, both prepared by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. For 
the definition and sources of the rest of variables, see the Note to Table 6. 
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Endnotes 
1 A more general analysis of territorial disparities in labour markets can be found in OECD (2000) and 
Eurostat (2002). 
2 There are, however, some important exceptions. Dolado et al. (1997) and Lorences et al. (1995) 
examine the characteristics of industry minimum wages and their influence on wage determination in 
Spain using limited samples of branch collective agreements. In turn, Cardoso and Portugal (2003) 
infer industry minimum wages for the Portuguese economy from the distribution of actual wages and 
analyse their determinants. 
3 An application of this procedure can be found in Hirschberg and Lye (2001). 
4 Percentage difference is calculated as (ej –1)*100, where j is the relevant coefficient. 
5 The estimated wage equation appears to be meaningful as the returns on the personal and 
workplace characteristics are consistent with those in the literature on wage determination. Full results 
are not reported, but are available from the authors on request.  
6 This implies that actual wages in Basque Country are about 28% higher than in Extremadura for all 
skill levels. 
7 If regional dummies are further interacted with individual controls the adjusted standard deviation of 
regional coefficients remains fairly similar. Assuming in the specification of the Mincerian wage 
equation that relative wage differences over skills are the same for each region is not, thus, a strong 
assumption. 
8 The SES is the Spanish national sample of the European Structure of Earnings Survey 1995, a 
grouping of national surveys conducted by the statistical offices of the European Union countries 
according to a standard methodology designed by Eurostat.  
9 Quantile regression techniques allow the impact of a variable on particular points of the conditional 
distribution of wages to be estimated, given the other explanatory variables in the model. This 
contrasts with OLS, which estimates the conditional mean of wages given the explanatory variables. 
For a discussion of quantile regressions, see Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Buchinsky (1994). 
10 Note that the territorial influence on wage determination may be underestimated. Regional 
information in the SES refers to the Spanish regions, whilst a wider territorial variability is highly 
plausible at the province level (the 17 Spanish regions divide into 50 provinces), to the extent that this 
finer territorial reference is the usual reference in non-national collective agreements in Spain. 
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11 More details on the database can be found in Simón (2001c). 
12 As in Section 2, the equation is estimated by restricted least squares, with the constraint that the 
employment-weighted sum of the regional dummy coefficients equals zero. As long as the information 
available on the number of workers covered by each industry agreement is not reliable, the 
employment weights used are those derived from the Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población 
Activa).  
13 Seven occupations are considered: university degree, non-university degree, skilled white collar  
semi-skilled white collar, skilled blue collar, semi-skilled blue collar, and unskilled blue collar. 
14 The high bivariate correlation between both variables (0.57) and between these and other variables 
related to regional productivity (firm size, foreign capital presence) suggest that they should not be 
included in the model at the same time due to problems of collinearity. For this reason, we only 
included capital stock.  
15 Farber (1986) and Blau and Khan (1999) provide a summary of the literature on the role of trade 
unions in wage determination. The role of unemployment rates on wage levels has been considered in 
insider-outsider models (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988) and, particularly, in some versions of wage 
efficiency models (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
16 A possible explanation for this result might be that territories (firms) in which activities of R+D are 
significant can guarantee higher wages, which are included in the collective bargaining agreements. 
However, in the other regions (firms), the strategy might be to negotiate wage complements linked to 
productivity, which could increase – if there are no innovations – by introducing physical capital. This 
argument would explain why the industry minimum wage might be related to R+D expenses but not to 
the physical capital stock. It should be pointed out that as there is no empirical evidence supporting 
the argument, this explanation is purely tentative. 
